Brexit thread

[cyril evans awaydays]

If Brexit was only about economic arguments, I would have voted to leave because the Remain side were absolutely abysmal on that side of things. So, I probably should be thinking that this is more "Project Fear" stuff, but, this

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-46366162

seems different because they are specific costings for different scenarios rather than the vague stuff we had during the Referendum.

It seems we have reached a state where the Prime Minister and her Chancellor are arguing that the negotiated plan is best because we'll be about £3 billion a year worse off compared to £10 billion a year if there's no deal - is this really what 17 million plus people thought they were voting for?

We have probably reached the point where we can have an informed debate about the options for the country. Unfortunately it is probably too late in the day.

Option A

May's deal. It honours the referendum result in that we officially leave the EU but then have a transition period where to all intents and purposes we remain subject to EU rules that runs to the end of 2020 but could extend to the end of 2022. At that point either a backstop kicks in if we haven't negotiated a trade deal with the EU in that time. After transition freedom of movement for EU citizens (out and in) is curtailed and we leave the Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policies.

The Irish border remains unpoliced but Northern Ireland gets special status. Goods flow freely as we remain aligned to the EU customs code. The level of alignment we have with the EU customs union restricts the ability negotiate trade deals with other third countries. After transition we no longer pay significant amounts to the EU (we may still pay sizeable amounts to remain a member of certain EU institutions) but the net estimated consequence is the UK is £40b worse off over a 15 year period. We are likely to remain subject to a significant amount of EU law going forward with no say in its drafting and the European Court of Justice will hold sway over its interpretation.

Option B

Leave with no deal on 29th March 2019. It honours the referendum result. There is no transition period and from the date of leaving we will engage with the EU as any third country that has not negotiated a trade deal on WTO rule terms. Customs and tariff barriers kick in immediately for all goods entering and leaving the EU from the UK and vice versa. Interim reciprocal arrangements beyond WTO rules could be negotiated on a contingency basis (UK govt has produced technical notices covering over 100 different areas for a no-deal scenario). There are risks in the immediate period after departure that infrastructure may not be in place and delays in movement of goods arise at key points of entry into the UK.

Freedom of movement rights end at withdrawal and the UK can immediately start negotiations with third countries on new trade deals. In the interim they may need to trade with these countries on the basis of any deals negotiated between them and the EU. Payments to the EU will cease and a possible reduction in the amounts the UK has said it pay on leaving could be imposed. There are risks that a hard border would need to be imposed on the island of Ireland. Reports suggest that the UK government estimates that the country will be £150b worse off over 15 years under this scenario. UK parliament will have full sovereignty over its laws with no jurisdiction for the ECJ.

Option C

Remain in the EU. This does not honour the referendum result without the interjection of another vote to override the June 2016 vote. We remain in the single market and the customs union including free movement for EU citizens. We are subject to EU law though we have a say in shaping it but the ultimate arbiter of interpretation remains the ECJ. We continue to make contributions to the EU. Issues over whether Article 50 can be unilaterally rescinded and even if so whether the UK would retain the terms of its membership before the Article 50 notice was served (eg whether the rebate negotiated by Margaret Thatcher would be retained).

If Option A is voted down then other variants such as leaving on terms like Norway has now may emerge. Personally have no idea what will happen next and at what cost to the social cohesion of the country.

[cyril evans awaydays]

It would appear that reports were off the mark. The government has published an economic analysis of the impact of its Chequers proposal but not the deal negotiated and agreed!

[Taunton Blue Genie]

We have probably reached the point where we can have an informed debate about the options for the country. Unfortunately it is probably too late in the day.

Option A

May's deal. It honours the referendum result in that we officially leave the EU but then have a transition period where to all intents and purposes we remain subject to EU rules that runs to the end of 2020 but could extend to the end of 2022. At that point either a backstop kicks in if we haven't negotiated a trade deal with the EU in that time. After transition freedom of movement for EU citizens (out and in) is curtailed and we leave the Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policies.

The Irish border remains unpoliced but Northern Ireland gets special status. Goods flow freely as we remain aligned to the EU customs code. The level of alignment we have with the EU customs union restricts the ability negotiate trade deals with other third countries. After transition we no longer pay significant amounts to the EU (we may still pay sizeable amounts to remain a member of certain EU institutions) but the net estimated consequence is the UK is £40b worse off over a 15 year period. We are likely to remain subject to a significant amount of EU law going forward with no say in its drafting and the European Court of Justice will hold sway over its interpretation.

Option B

Leave with no deal on 29th March 2019. It honours the referendum result. There is no transition period and from the date of leaving we will engage with the EU as any third country that has not negotiated a trade deal on WTO rule terms. Customs and tariff barriers kick in immediately for all goods entering and leaving the EU from the UK and vice versa. Interim reciprocal arrangements beyond WTO rules could be negotiated on a contingency basis (UK govt has produced technical notices covering over 100 different areas for a no-deal scenario). There are risks in the immediate period after departure that infrastructure may not be in place and delays in movement of goods arise at key points of entry into the UK.

Freedom of movement rights end at withdrawal and the UK can immediately start negotiations with third countries on new trade deals. In the interim they may need to trade with these countries on the basis of any deals negotiated between them and the EU. Payments to the EU will cease and a possible reduction in the amounts the UK has said it pay on leaving could be imposed. There are risks that a hard border would need to be imposed on the island of Ireland. Reports suggest that the UK government estimates that the country will be £150b worse off over 15 years under this scenario. UK parliament will have full sovereignty over its laws with no jurisdiction for the ECJ.

Option C

Remain in the EU. This does not honour the referendum result without the interjection of another vote to override the June 2016 vote. We remain in the single market and the customs union including free movement for EU citizens. We are subject to EU law though we have a say in shaping it but the ultimate arbiter of interpretation remains the ECJ. We continue to make contributions to the EU. Issues over whether Article 50 can be unilaterally rescinded and even if so whether the UK would retain the terms of its membership before the Article 50 notice was served (eg whether the rebate negotiated by Margaret Thatcher would be retained).

If Option A is voted down then other variants such as leaving on terms like Norway has now may emerge. Personally have no idea what will happen next and at what cost to the social cohesion of the country.

How many people who voted in referendum (and on both sides of the debate) will have had even a scintilla of understanding as to the complexity of the situation as it was and how it will be?

[the other bob wilson]

We have probably reached the point where we can have an informed debate about the options for the country. Unfortunately it is probably too late in the day.

Option A

May's deal. It honours the referendum result in that we officially leave the EU but then have a transition period where to all intents and purposes we remain subject to EU rules that runs to the end of 2020 but could extend to the end of 2022. At that point either a backstop kicks in if we haven't negotiated a trade deal with the EU in that time. After transition freedom of movement for EU citizens (out and in) is curtailed and we leave the Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policies.

The Irish border remains unpoliced but Northern Ireland gets special status. Goods flow freely as we remain aligned to the EU customs code. The level of alignment we have with the EU customs union restricts the ability negotiate trade deals with other third countries. After transition we no longer pay significant amounts to the EU (we may still pay sizeable amounts to remain a member of certain EU institutions) but the net estimated consequence is the UK is £40b worse off over a 15 year period. We are likely to remain subject to a significant amount of EU law going forward with no say in its drafting and the European Court of Justice will hold sway over its interpretation.

Option B

Leave with no deal on 29th March 2019. It honours the referendum result. There is no transition period and from the date of leaving we will engage with the EU as any third country that has not negotiated a trade deal on WTO rule terms. Customs and tariff barriers kick in immediately for all goods entering and leaving the EU from the UK and vice versa. Interim reciprocal arrangements beyond WTO rules could be negotiated on a contingency basis (UK govt has produced technical notices covering over 100 different areas for a no-deal scenario). There are risks in the immediate period after departure that infrastructure may not be in place and delays in movement of goods arise at key points of entry into the UK.

Freedom of movement rights end at withdrawal and the UK can immediately start negotiations with third countries on new trade deals. In the interim they may need to trade with these countries on the basis of any deals negotiated between them and the EU. Payments to the EU will cease and a possible reduction in the amounts the UK has said it pay on leaving could be imposed. There are risks that a hard border would need to be imposed on the island of Ireland. Reports suggest that the UK government estimates that the country will be £150b worse off over 15 years under this scenario. UK parliament will have full sovereignty over its laws with no jurisdiction for the ECJ.

Option C

Remain in the EU. This does not honour the referendum result without the interjection of another vote to override the June 2016 vote. We remain in the single market and the customs union including free movement for EU citizens. We are subject to EU law though we have a say in shaping it but the ultimate arbiter of interpretation remains the ECJ. We continue to make contributions to the EU. Issues over whether Article 50 can be unilaterally rescinded and even if so whether the UK would retain the terms of its membership before the Article 50 notice was served (eg whether the rebate negotiated by Margaret Thatcher would be retained).

If Option A is voted down then other variants such as leaving on terms like Norway has now may emerge. Personally have no idea what will happen next and at what cost to the social cohesion of the country.

Thanks for that. I agree with you about the possible cost to the social cohesion of the country. I don't see anyway out of the situation that satisfies everyone, there are going to be some very angry people around when any attempt for us to get back to "normal" is attempted - not that we're going to be in a position which could be called normal for years yet.