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Re: The Donald Trump thread
[QUOTE=az city;5583371]
He's gone missing on this one
[QUOTE=az city;5583371]
Originally posted by JamesWales
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You don't need a PhD to know that facts are worth more than a theory or model.
If your statement were true (and it isn't) it would bare fruit in the display of key economic data.
But you never produce that. When asked you play another one of your ad hominem attack cards.
You can pity me all you like. I'm not the one making outlandish statements and then abusing people for having a different opinion on an internet forum.[/QUOTE
Direct from the OBR in 2025
"Specifically, our latest economy forecast assumes that:
The post-Brexit trading relationship between the UK and EU, as set out in the ‘Trade and Cooperation Agreement’ (TCA) that came into effect on 1 January 2021, will reduce long-run productivity by 4 per cent relative to remaining in the EU. This largely reflects our view that the increase in non-tariff barriers on UK-EU trade acts as an additional impediment to the exploitation of comparative advantage. In order to generate this figure, we looked at a range of external estimates of the effect of leaving the EU under the terms of a ‘typical’ free trade agreement (FTA) (see Box 2.1 of our March 2020 EFO for more information). Our assessment is that the TCA is broadly similar to the ‘typical’ FTAs assumed in those studies and reflected in our forecasts since March 2020. We estimate that around two-fifths of the 4 per cent impact had already occurred by the time the TCA came into force, as a result of uncertainty weighing on investment and capital deepening (see Box 2.2 of our March 2021 EFO for more information).
Both exports and imports will be around 15 per cent lower in the long run than if the UK had remained in the EU. The size of this adjustment is calibrated to match the average estimate of a number of external studies that considered the impact of leaving the EU on the volume of UK-EU trade (see our November 2016 EFO for more information). Impacts on export and import growth are similar, therefore downward revisions to gross trade flows are broadly neutral in their effect on the current account over the medium term. Box 2.5 of our October 2021 EFO and Box 2.6 of our March 2022 EFO provide initial assessments of this assumption.
New trade deals with non-EU countries will not have a material impact, and any effect will be gradual (see our 2018 Discussion paper for more detail). This is because the deals concluded to date either replicate (or ‘roll over’) deals that the UK already benefited from as an EU member state, or do not have a material impact on our forecast. An example of the former is the UK-Japan ‘Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement’ – which largely mirrors the agreement Japan signed with the EU in 2019 – where the Government’s economic impact assessment suggests that it will increase the UK’s GDP by 0.1 per cent over the next 15 years (see the Government’s October 2020 UK-Japan CEPA: final impact assessment). This estimate is relative to not having a trade deal with Japan, whereas the UK would have been part of the EU-Japan agreement had it not left the EU. An example of the latter is the free-trade agreement with Australia, the first to be concluded with a country that does not have a similar arrangement with the EU. The Government’s estimate of the economic impact is that it will raise the UK’s GDP by 0.1 per cent over 15 years (see the Government’s December 2021 UK-Australia FTA: impact assessment).
We had assumed that the Government’s new post-Brexit migration regime would reduce net inward migration to the UK, settling at 129,000 a year in the medium-term, based on the ONS ‘zero net EU migration variant’ of the 2018-based population projections (see Box 2.4 of our March 2020 EFO). We have since revised up our projections for net migration to reflect evidence of sustained strength in inward migration since the post-Brexit migration regime was introduced. We now assume net migration settles at 315,000 a year in the medium term, based on the ONS 2021-based interim population projections (see Box 2.3 of our March 2024 EFO). This compares to 245,000 in our November 2023 forecast, which was based on the ONS 2020-based interim migration projections."
You'll note they aren't doing cross sectional comparisons as is YOUR erroneous want.
If your statement were true (and it isn't) it would bare fruit in the display of key economic data.
But you never produce that. When asked you play another one of your ad hominem attack cards.
You can pity me all you like. I'm not the one making outlandish statements and then abusing people for having a different opinion on an internet forum.[/QUOTE
Direct from the OBR in 2025
"Specifically, our latest economy forecast assumes that:
The post-Brexit trading relationship between the UK and EU, as set out in the ‘Trade and Cooperation Agreement’ (TCA) that came into effect on 1 January 2021, will reduce long-run productivity by 4 per cent relative to remaining in the EU. This largely reflects our view that the increase in non-tariff barriers on UK-EU trade acts as an additional impediment to the exploitation of comparative advantage. In order to generate this figure, we looked at a range of external estimates of the effect of leaving the EU under the terms of a ‘typical’ free trade agreement (FTA) (see Box 2.1 of our March 2020 EFO for more information). Our assessment is that the TCA is broadly similar to the ‘typical’ FTAs assumed in those studies and reflected in our forecasts since March 2020. We estimate that around two-fifths of the 4 per cent impact had already occurred by the time the TCA came into force, as a result of uncertainty weighing on investment and capital deepening (see Box 2.2 of our March 2021 EFO for more information).
Both exports and imports will be around 15 per cent lower in the long run than if the UK had remained in the EU. The size of this adjustment is calibrated to match the average estimate of a number of external studies that considered the impact of leaving the EU on the volume of UK-EU trade (see our November 2016 EFO for more information). Impacts on export and import growth are similar, therefore downward revisions to gross trade flows are broadly neutral in their effect on the current account over the medium term. Box 2.5 of our October 2021 EFO and Box 2.6 of our March 2022 EFO provide initial assessments of this assumption.
New trade deals with non-EU countries will not have a material impact, and any effect will be gradual (see our 2018 Discussion paper for more detail). This is because the deals concluded to date either replicate (or ‘roll over’) deals that the UK already benefited from as an EU member state, or do not have a material impact on our forecast. An example of the former is the UK-Japan ‘Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement’ – which largely mirrors the agreement Japan signed with the EU in 2019 – where the Government’s economic impact assessment suggests that it will increase the UK’s GDP by 0.1 per cent over the next 15 years (see the Government’s October 2020 UK-Japan CEPA: final impact assessment). This estimate is relative to not having a trade deal with Japan, whereas the UK would have been part of the EU-Japan agreement had it not left the EU. An example of the latter is the free-trade agreement with Australia, the first to be concluded with a country that does not have a similar arrangement with the EU. The Government’s estimate of the economic impact is that it will raise the UK’s GDP by 0.1 per cent over 15 years (see the Government’s December 2021 UK-Australia FTA: impact assessment).
We had assumed that the Government’s new post-Brexit migration regime would reduce net inward migration to the UK, settling at 129,000 a year in the medium-term, based on the ONS ‘zero net EU migration variant’ of the 2018-based population projections (see Box 2.4 of our March 2020 EFO). We have since revised up our projections for net migration to reflect evidence of sustained strength in inward migration since the post-Brexit migration regime was introduced. We now assume net migration settles at 315,000 a year in the medium term, based on the ONS 2021-based interim population projections (see Box 2.3 of our March 2024 EFO). This compares to 245,000 in our November 2023 forecast, which was based on the ONS 2020-based interim migration projections."
You'll note they aren't doing cross sectional comparisons as is YOUR erroneous want.
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